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I. Introduction
On July 23, 2010, pro se plaintiff Shepard Johnson filed a
diversity action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of California.1 Johnson alleged that more than a dozen
defendants initiated criminal proceedings against Johnson in
Panama and conspired to avoid fulfilling conditions, covenants,
and restrictions for a planned development.2 Johnson alleged
malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy to commit malicious

1. Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. May 10, 2012). In Johnson, the court asked whether it had personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, id. at *2–7, and whether a claim against a
defendant over whom the court lacked personal jurisdiction could be severed
from the action and transferred to another venue. Id. at *8–10. The Johnson
court, finding that personal jurisdiction did not exist over defendant Kim
Parsons, severed the plaintiff’s claims against Parsons under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 21 and transferred the claims to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado. Id. at *9. The court determined that personal jurisdiction
did not exist over Parsons in California and personal jurisdiction for the other
defendants did not exist in Colorado (where Parsons resided). Id. at *8. The
Johnson court then conducted a review of the federal circuits’ decisions on
whether the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1631 permitted federal courts to transfer
less than a full action (excluding the plaintiff’s claims against other defendants)
and determined that such a transfer was permitted. Id. at *8–9. After
determining that a transfer would be in the interests of justice, id. at *9, the
court severed the plaintiff’s claims against Parsons and transferred those claims
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, id.
2. See id. at *1 (providing case background).
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prosecution by individual defendants in California, Minnesota,
Tennessee, Colorado, Florida, New Hampshire, and Texas.3
Johnson sought a remedy for the wrongs he alleged, but he
was a pro se litigant who lacked legal training.4 Colorado resident
and defendant Kim Parsons sought dismissal from the case
arguing that the California district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over her.5 The Johnson court noted that, when a
court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it must decide
whether to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim against that defendant or
transfer the case to a forum that would have personal jurisdiction
over that defendant.6 In this case, the court found that Parsons’s
home state of Colorado would have personal jurisdiction over
Parsons, but transfer or dismissal would be problematic.7
Dismissing the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction8 was
unacceptable because “the statute of limitations would likely bar
refiling the claims against defendant Parsons in Colorado and
plaintiff would be unnecessarily required to pay another filing
fee.”9 Alternatively, the court might have transferred the entire
action to Colorado under a federal statute that permits the
transfer of a “civil action” to an appropriate court if “there is a
3. See id. (listing defendants and summarizing the plaintiff’s claims).
4. See id. (describing the plaintiff as pro se); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1341 (9th ed. 2009) (“[A pro se litigant is o]ne who represents oneself in a court
proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer . . . .”).
5. See Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *1 (noting defendant Parsons’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)); Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (explaining the standard
required for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant). If a defendant is not “present within the territory of the forum, he
[must] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id.
(internal citations omitted). The Johnson court determined that Parsons lacked
the necessary minimum contacts with California to justify the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. See Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *6 (“The court
concludes that it does not have personal jurisdiction over defendant Parsons.”).
6. See Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *8 (“[T]he only issue remaining is
whether plaintiff’s claims against defendant Parsons should be dismissed or
transferred to the District of Colorado where Parsons resides.”).
7. See id. at *8 (explaining that the court could not transfer the entire
action and dismissal was not “in the interest of justice”).
8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (listing a lack of personal jurisdiction as a
defense that a defendant may raise to a complaint).
9. Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *9.
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want of jurisdiction” and “it is in the interest of justice.”10 The
Johnson court noted, however, that it “cannot transfer the entire
action to the District of Colorado because it is obvious that the
Colorado district court would lack personal jurisdiction over
several of the defendants.”11
In attempting to determine how to handle the claim related
to defendant Parsons, the Johnson court encountered a split
between the federal circuits about how to handle the dismissal or
transfer of an action when the court has jurisdiction over only
some of the claims and defendants.12 The heart of the conflict is a
disagreement about whether a federal district court may transfer
less than a full action to another forum where jurisdiction is
appropriate over only a part of the action.13
On one side, the D.C. Circuit has found a court may not
transfer less than an entire legal action.14 On the opposite side,
the Tenth Circuit,15 Third Circuit,16 and the Federal Circuit17
have found that a district court may transfer claims, less than an
entire legal action, where the court lacks jurisdiction over those

10. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012).
11. Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *8.
12. See id. (“The Circuits are split regarding whether the language of 28
U.S.C. § 1631 permits federal courts to partially transfer an action.”).
13. See infra Part III.A–B (discussing the circuit split and the primary
ways partial venue transfer is rationalized).
14. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(“Because Section 1631 directs a court to transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks
jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim, we find that the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in failing . . . to transfer Hill's claims . . . .”); infra notes
156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s views).
15. See FDIC. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming a
district court’s order that transferred some, but not all, of plaintiff’s claims
because the court effectively severed the problematic claims under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 21 prior to transfer); infra notes 162–70 and accompanying
text (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s views on the circuit split).
16. See D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, 566 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2009)
(permitting “transfer of all or only part of an action”); infra notes 171–75 and
accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s view of the circuit split).
17. See United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (holding that “§ 1631 allows for the transfer of less than all of the claims
in a civil action to the Court of Federal Claims”); infra notes 176–87 and
accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s rationale for allowing
severance and transfer of a partial action).
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claims and the associated defendants.18 The circuits that allow
transfer of less than an entire action disagree regarding the
justification for transfer.19
This Note argues that the circuit split regarding whether less
than a full action may be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 163120
should be resolved by amending the terms “civil action” and
“case” to include “claims” in §§ 1631, 1404, and 1406 to
consistently allow district courts to transfer claims that are filed
in an inconvenient or flawed forum.21 Part II of this Note
discusses the historical doctrine of forum non conveniens and the
development of the various statutory mechanisms for
transferring federal cases between judicial districts, noting the
major differences between the various statutory means of
transfer.22 Part III details the circuit split regarding partial
transfers under § 1631 and the different interpretations of
§ 1631.23 Part IV discusses the possibilities for resolving the
circuit split and explains why amending Title 28 is the best
means for resolving the conflict.24
This Note demonstrates that § 1631 should be interpreted in
light of its historical development from the forum non conveniens
doctrine and transfers effectuated under § 1631 should be treated
similarly to §§ 1404 (a transfer mechanism for the sake of
convenience) and 1406 (a transfer mechanism that addresses
claims filed in a flawed forum).25 These considerations are best
served by amending the current transfer statutes to reflect
permissive transfer of claims within an action and detailing a
clear process for severance and transfer of claims over which a
district court lacks jurisdiction.26
18. See infra Part III.A (explaining the circuit split in detail).
19. See infra Part III.B (discussing the primary division between the
circuits on § 1631).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012).
21. See infra Part IV (recommending a resolution for the circuit split).
22. See infra Part II (discussing the historical and modern venue transfer
mechanisms).
23. See infra Part III (explaining the current circuit split regarding partial
transfer).
24. See infra Part IV (discussing the recommendation to resolve the circuit
split).
25. See infra Part IV.B–C (detailing support for Title 28 amendment).
26. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the proposed amendment to Title 28).
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II. The Development of Transfer Mechanisms and Venue Rules
Venue rules are designed to assist the federal procedural goal
of “expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and
controversies on their merits.”27 While primarily concerned with
convenience,28 venue rules are also used to correct improperly
filed actions and prevent injustice that may result when an action
is dismissed for improper filing.29 A court cannot hear a case or
issue a binding resolution if it lacks jurisdiction,30 and venue
rules assist in moving a case to a place where jurisdiction is
appropriate.31
There are a variety of statutory transfer mechanisms
available, but each is designed to serve a specific purpose. The
most common, or most familiar, venue transfer devices are the
statutory provisions that provide for a transfer for convenience32
or a transfer to cure an improper filing.33 Upon a motion to
27. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962).
28. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 n.7
(2013) (“‘[The] purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant
against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of
trial.’” (quoting Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183–84 (1979)));
17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.01[1] (3d ed.
1999) (“Venue statutes generally are concerned with convenience. They seek to
channel lawsuits to an appropriately convenient court, given the matters raised
and the parties involved in an action.”).
29. See Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466 (noting that § 1406 was enacted to avoid
“the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their
actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with regard to the
existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often
turn”); C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Statute
(28 U.S.C. § 1406) Providing for Dismissal or Transfer of Cases for Improper
Venue, 3 A.L.R. FED. 467, 467 (2014) [hereinafter Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406]
(discussing the means by which transfer may be accomplished when the original
forum was not a proper venue).
30. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–19 (1945) (noting
that due process requires a defendant to have sufficient contacts, ties, or
relations to a forum to allow the court to make a judgment binding on that
defendant); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009) (describing jurisdiction
as “[a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree”).
31. See Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (discussing transfer
when the original forum was not a proper venue).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (detailing the standard for transferring a
case from one proper venue to another for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and “in the interest of justice”).
33. See id. § 1406 (explaining the standard for transferring a case “laying
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transfer, the reviewing court has the discretion to dismiss the
action for refiling in another venue, to transfer the action to a
new forum, or to deny transfer based upon the “interests of
justice” or “fairness” that might be served.34 The consequences of
the mechanism used, however, can vary, particularly with
regards to the choice-of-law principles that apply.35
A. Common Law Transfer and Dismissal Mechanisms
The most prominent venue transfer statutes grew from the
historical forum non conveniens doctrine.36 The forum non
conveniens doctrine is a common law development that allows a
district court to “decline to exercise its jurisdiction, even though
the court has jurisdiction and venue, when it appears that the
convenience of the parties and the court and the interests of
justice indicate that the action should be tried in another
forum.”37 The doctrine allowed a federal court to dismiss a case if

venue in the wrong division or district”); id. § 1631 (detailing the standard for
transferring a case where “there is a want of jurisdiction”).
34. See id. § 1404 (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer . . . .”); id. § 1406 (“The district
court . . . shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer a case . . . .”);
id. § 1631 (“[T]he court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such
action or appeal to any other such court . . . .”).
35. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing the choice-oflaw rules that apply to transfer effectuated under § 1404); infra notes 100–02
and accompanying text (discussing choice-of-law rules that apply for a § 1406
transfer); infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (discussing the choice-oflaw rules that accompany § 1631 transfers).
36. See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, §§ 111.70–.95 (discussing the forum
non conveniens doctrine in detail).
37. Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing Piper Aircraft Co v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981)); see also Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 532 (1947) (noting that a district
court may decline to exercise jurisdiction when “a defendant shows much
harassment and plaintiff’s response . . . indicates such disadvantage as to
support the inference that the forum he chose would not ordinarily be thought a
suitable one to decide the controversy”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
507 (1947) (“The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by
the letter of a general venue statute.”); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.70
(discussing the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine).
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there was a more convenient alternative forum, requiring the
plaintiff to refile the case as a new action elsewhere.38
Forum non conveniens is a flexible doctrine that considers
the fairness and convenience of a forum for the parties in each
individual case.39 The relative convenience of a forum may change
depending upon the facts of the case, and thus, a “rigid rule to
govern discretion” is not appropriate and “each case turns on its
facts.”40 The plaintiff’s choice of forum is given deference and
“should rarely be disturbed” by dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds.41 The Supreme Court has noted, however,
that “[j]urisdiction and venue requirements are often easily
satisfied” and plaintiffs will often have an opportunity to choose a
forum that is inconvenient for defendants.42 Even so, a plaintiff’s
choice should not be overruled unless the facts of the case
establish “oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant as to be out
of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience” or that the “court’s
own administrative or legal problems” show the chosen forum to
be inappropriate.43 “In any balancing of conveniences, a real
showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home
38. See Howe v. Goldcorp Invest. Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1991)
(noting that dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine “has the
practical effect of requiring the plaintiff to file his complaint in a more
convenient forum elsewhere”); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.70
(discussing the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine).
39. See Piper Aircraft Co v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (emphasizing
the Court’s repeated support of “the need to retain flexibility”); Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 531 (1947) (noting that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in relying on defendant’s silence regarding
convenience of the parties and witnesses, cost of litigation, speed of trial, or
adequacy of remedy); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (listing
a variety of interests that might be considered when dismissing under forum
non conveniens); Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir.
2008) (noting that a “district court is accorded substantial flexibility in
evaluating a forum non conveniens motion” (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v.
Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988))); Thomas T. McClendon, Note, The Power of a
Suggestion: The Use of Forum Selection Clauses by Delaware Corporations, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067, 2086–87 (2012) (listing nine factors relevant in forum
non conveniens analysis and noting cases in support).
40. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 249 (quoting Williams v. Green Bay &
W. R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 557 (1946)).
41. Id. at 241.
42. Id. at 250.
43. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947).
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forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant
may have shown.”44
Historically, dismissal under the forum non conveniens
doctrine was the only means of protection available to defendants
if a plaintiff chose to abuse venue provisions.45 This doctrine,
however, created problems. In some instances, forum non
conveniens could not be applied due to certain federal law
restrictions, like the Federal Employers Liability Act.46 The
doctrine has also been found to be inconvenient and harsh to
plaintiffs when a court dismissed a case on forum non conveniens
grounds and the plaintiff was forced to refile in a new forum.47 As
noted in Johnson v. Mitchell,48 the refiled case may be barred by a
statute of limitations in the new forum.49 Some courts have
imposed conditions on forum non conveniens dismissal,
preventing a defendant from raising statute of limitation,
jurisdiction, or venue defenses once the plaintiff has refiled the
case.50 Conditional relief in refiling, however, is not uniformly
44. Id.
45. See Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within
the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1984) (explaining that until
1948 “[d]ismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens was the only remedy for
abuse of venue provisions”); Jeremy Jay Butler, Note, Venue Transfer When a
Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction: Where Are Courts Going With 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 789, 795 (2006) (discussing the legal background of
venue transfer).
46. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012); see, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner,
314 U.S. 44, 48–53 (1941) (denying the applicability of the forum non conveniens
doctrine because the Federal Employers Liability Act allowed a claim to be filed
in a limited number of venues and dismissal under forum non conveniens meant
that the case would be barred upon refiling).
47. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 30–31 (1955) (noting that the
creation of § 1404 was designed to relieve the harsh results of forum non
conveniens by allowing the opportunity to transfer a case rather than subjecting
it to dismissal (citing All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d
Cir. 1952))).
48. No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2012).
49. See id. at *9 (noting that a statute of limitation may bar refiling after a
case is dismissed).
50. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842,
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (requiring three conditions prior to forum non conveniens
dismissal), aff’d in part, modified in part, 809 F.3d 195, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1987);
John Bies, Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 500–03
(2000) (discussing the different types of conditions that have been imposed on
dismissal and listing cases in support).
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used, and the harsh results of a forum non conveniens dismissal
are still present. 51
Use of the forum non conveniens doctrine is no longer as
prevalent in federal courts due to the creation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404,52 a new way for a case to be moved from one jurisdiction
to another for the sake of convenience.53 The development of
§ 1404 allows for transfer between forums within the federal
system without the harsh consequences of dismissal.54 After the
creation of § 1404, the forum non conveniens doctrine is only
applicable in federal courts when the alternative forum is outside
the federal court system, for example abroad or a state court.55
Section 1404(a) is a “codification of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum
is within the federal system . . . . For the remaining set of cases
calling for a nonfederal forum, § 1404(a) has no application, but

51. Bies, supra note 50, at 504–05 (discussing the different circumstances
when courts have conditioned forum non conveniens dismissals).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012).
53. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955) (“An order
transferring it to another district does not end [a case] but preserves it as
against the running of the statute of limitations and for all other purposes.”
(quoting Jiffy Lubricator Co, Inc. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360, 362
(4th Cir. 1949))).
54. See § 1404(a) (“[A] district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”); Norwood, 349
U.S. at 32 (“The harshest result of the application of the old doctrine of forum
non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision in
§ 1404(a) for transfer.”); Howe v. Goldcorp Invest. Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947 (1st
Cir. 1991) (noting the difference between application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine and § 1404); C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Application of
Common-Law Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Courts After the
Enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) Authorizing Transfer to Another District, 10
A.L.R. FED. 352, 352 (2014) [hereinafter Jhong, Forum Non Conveniens]
(detailing changes to the federal forum non conveniens doctrine after the
creation of 28 U.S.C. § 1404).
55. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430
(2007) (explaining that the forum non conveniens doctrine continues to be
applicable in federal courts only when alternative forum is abroad “and perhaps
in rare instances where a state or territorial court serves litigational
convenience best”); U.S. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2
(1994) (“[T]he federal doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing
application only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad.”); Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (dismissing a wrongful death action to be
refiled in a foreign jurisdiction).
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the residual doctrine of forum non conveniens” does.56 While
applied in different litigation circumstances, § 1404(a) and the
forum non conveniens doctrine entail the same “balancing-ofinterests standard.”57
Under the forum non conveniens doctrine, a court may, in
rare instances, maintain a partial action, keeping claims in an
action while dismissing others.58 Courts have explained that “[i]n
deciding where a trial should be held the central notions of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens are the convenience of the
parties and their witnesses and that justice be served.”59 Forum
non conveniens is a flexible doctrine and “[d]epending upon the
facts of the particular case, a district court may dismiss part of a
lawsuit while deciding the merits of other issues.”60 While partial
dismissal is rooted in the traditional concerns of fairness and
flexibility that support the forum non conveniens doctrine, it is a
relatively recent development of the doctrine beginning after the
creation of § 1404.61 Partial dismissal under the forum non
conveniens doctrine has also been accepted in some state courts,
but it is equally rare.62
56. Atl. Marine Constr. Co v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 (2013)
(citing Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430).
57. Id. (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
58. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505–06 (1947) (noting that the
use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be rare); Scottish Air Int’l,
Inc. v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1234–35 (2d Cir. 1996)
(allowing the district court to retain a contempt claim and dismiss other claims
on forum non conveniens grounds).
59. Scottish Air Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d at 1227.
60. Id. at 1234 (citing Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 378
(2d Cir. 1972)); see also Allarcom Pay TV, Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 210
F.3d 381, 381 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Ninth Circuit and others “hold[]
that district courts have discretion to enter final judgment on some claims and
dismiss the remainder for forum non conveniens”).
61. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (listing cases that have
allowed partial dismissal; the supporting cases have taken place after the
creation of § 1404).
62. See Field Indus., Inc. v. D.J. Williams, Inc., 470 A.2d 1266, 1266 (Me.
1984) (affirming dismissal of a counterclaim on forum non conveniens grounds
while the main claim is retained); United Techs. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., Co.,
555 N.E.2d 224, 227–29 (Mass. 1990) (noting in dicta that part of an action
could be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds if all the issues could not
be resolved in a single forum); Carwell v. Copeland, 63 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) (affirming dismissal of a counterclaim on forum non conveniens
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B. Statutory Venue Transfer Rules

1. Transfer for the Sake of Convenience, 28 U.S.C. § 1404
Use of the forum non conveniens doctrine diminished after
the adoption of a statutory mechanism for transfer within the
federal judicial system, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1404.63 Section 1404
governs venue transfers for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and was adopted in 1948.64 This act combined a
number of preexisting sections65 and was drafted to modify the
doctrine of forum non conveniens to permit the transfer of a case
from a proper venue to a more convenient venue if it was “in the
interests of justice.”66 Congress intended to create an easy means
to transfer cases from an original federal forum to a more
convenient federal forum.67 The adoption of § 1404 was thought to
resolve the venue provision issues that arose under the Federal

grounds and resolution of the main claim in summary judgment); Imperial
Imps. Co. v. Hugo Neu & Sons, Inc., 555 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(noting that a New York code provision allows that “a court may stay or dismiss
an action in whole or in part on forum non conveniens grounds upon the motion
of a party”) .
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012); see supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text
(discussing the relationships between the forum non conveniens doctrine and
§ 1404).
64. See Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1404, 62 Stat. 869, 937
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012)) (including the language of
§ 1404 for the first time); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 65–71 (1949) (discussing
in detail the legislative history of § 1404).
65. See § 1404, 62 Stat. at 937 (consolidating §§ 119 and 163 of title 28,
U.S.C., 1940 ed.).
66. See Jhong, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 54, at 352 (detailing
changes to the forum non conveniens doctrine after the creation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404); 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3841
(4th ed. 2010) (noting that the development of § 1404(a) was intended to prevent
the inconvenience created by the forum non conveniens doctrine and the waste
of time and money associated with refiling).
67. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 522 (1990) (noting that
Congress responded to the problem of broad venue provisions by permitting
transfer to a convenient federal court under § 1404(a) (citing Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634–36 (1964))); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 254 (1981) (stating that § 1404(a) was enacted to allow “easy change of
venue”); Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616 (noting that § 1404(a) “reflects an increased
desire to have federal civil suits tried in the federal system at the place called
for in the particular case by considerations of convenience and justice”).
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Employers Liability Act68 and to prevent abuse to defendants
under the new liberal federal joinder rules.69 Section 1404 was
“drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens,”70 and after its enactment, the forum non conveniens
doctrine fell out of common use within the federal system.71
In pertinent part, § 1404 states:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district of division where it might have been
brought or to any district of division to which all parties have
consented.
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any
action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature . . . , may be
transferred, in the discretion of the court . . . .72

Section 1404 permits transfer from one proper venue to another
proper venue for the purposes of convenience and if the interests
of justice so demand.73 Transfers that take place under this
section must follow the choice-of-law rules of the transferor
(sending) court.74 The Erie doctrine generally requires that a
federal court sitting in diversity apply the law that the local state
courts would apply to achieve uniformity of result between

68. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012); see also Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. at 60
(addressing the interaction of the venue provisions of the Federal Employers
Liability Act and the new § 1404).
69. See Edgar E. Bethell & Herschel Friday, The Federal Judicial Code of
1948, 3 ARK. L. REV. 146, 150 (1948) (commenting on the major changes
proposed by the Federal Judicial Code of 1948).
70. Hon. Clarence G. Galson, An Introduction to the New Federal Judicial
Code, 8 F.R.D. 201, 206 (1948).
71. See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.11 (discussing the purpose of
a § 1404 transfer); see generally 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3828
(describing the relationship between the forum non coveniens doctrine and
§ 1404).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012).
73. See id. (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district of
division where it might have been brought . . . .”).
74. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635–37 (1964) (finding that,
when a venue transfer takes place under §1404, a transferee court must apply
the state law that would have been applied if there had been no change of
venue).
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federal and state courts.75 Uniformity of results is important
because it assists in preventing forum shopping and achieving
equitable administration of the laws, the two major goals of the
Erie doctrine.76 A case transferred under § 1404 might present an
opportunity for forum-shopping litigants to benefit if different
laws applied after transfer.77 Thus, “[a] change of venue under
§ 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a
change of courtrooms.”78
Additionally, § 1404 differs from the forum non conveniens
doctrine because it requires that a full action be transferred if a
transfer takes place.79 An entire action, however, need not mean
the case as it was originally filed.80 Several circuits have allowed
claims to be severed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2181
and then permitted the severed claim to be transferred to a more

75. See id. at 638 (“This Court has often formulated the Erie doctrine by
stating that it establishes the principle of uniformity within a state, and
declaring that federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases are to apply the
laws ‘of the state in which they sit.’” (quoting Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 798,
503 (1941))).
76. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (naming these two
concerns the “twin aims of the Erie rule”).
77. See Van Dusen, 367 U.S. at 638 (explaining that the purpose of the Erie
doctrine would be defeated if defendants were able to gain the benefits of the
laws of another jurisdiction through transfer).
78. Id. at 639.
79. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509,
1518 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1404(a) only authorizes the transfer of an entire
action, not individual claims.”); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 764 F.2d
515, 516 (8th Cir. 1985) (“It is well established that the transferor court under
§ 1404 loses all jurisdiction over a case once transfer has occurred.” (internal
citation omitted)); Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1968)
(noting that § 1404(a) “authorizes the transfer only of an entire action and not of
individual claims”), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968).
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“[M]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for
dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on
just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
party.”); AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holdings Co., v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626 F.3d
699, 720 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that where certain claims are properly
severed the result is two or more separate actions); Wyndham Assocs., 398 F.2d
at 618 (“We believe that where the administration of justice would be materially
advanced by severance and transfer, a district court may properly sever the
claims against one or more defendants for the purpose of permitting the transfer
of the action against the other defendants . . . .”).
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
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convenient or proper venue.82 In keeping with the traditional
concerns of fairness and flexibility of the forum non conveniens
doctrine, it seems as if its statutory progeny is equally open to
allowing an action to be divided and its various parts to be
transferred or dismissed if the interests of justice so demand.
2. Transfer to Cure Filing in an Improper Venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1406
The current form of 28 U.S.C. § 140683 was also introduced in
1948.84 Section 1406 is a mechanism that allows a district court
to transfer a case from an improper venue to a proper venue.85 In
pertinent part, § 1406 states: “The district court of a district in
which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such
case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.”86 Section 1406 includes a discretionary element,
allowing a court the choice of dismissing or transferring the case
“in the interest of justice” if the original venue was improper87 or
if venue and personal jurisdiction are lacking.88 But if a party
82. See AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holdings Co., 626 F.3d at 720 (“Where
certain claims are properly severed, the result is that there are then two or more
separate ‘actions,’ and the district court may, pursuant to § 1404(a), transfer
certain of such separate actions while retaining jurisdiction of others.”); Toro Co.
v. Alsop, 565 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that the district court had
the power to sever a single count from a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 21 and transfer the count and a counterclaim to another federal
district court); see, e.g., Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., 5 F.3d 28, 33–
34 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting that severance and transfer may be used in cases
where the defendants are only indirectly connected, but denying that
circumstance in the present case).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012).
84. See Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1406, 62 Stat. 869, 937
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012)) (stating the text of § 1406 for
the first time).
85. See 28 U.S.C. §1406 (providing means to correct an improper venue).
86. Id. § 1406(a).
87. See id. § 1391 (explaining that proper venue is a judicial district where
all defendants reside, where a “substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred,” or where “any defendant is subject to the
court’s personal jurisdiction” if the other two provisions are not satisfied).
88. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (“The language of
§ 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however
wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the
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seeks to change venue under § 1406, and the dispute is not
waived, the court does not have the liberty to keep the case
because it is not a proper venue.89 Similarly, if venue is proper,
then the motion to transfer under § 1406 must generally be
denied.90 The definitions of a “proper” or “improper venue” have
been extended in some circuits to include transfer where venue
may be appropriate in the original forum, but some other obstacle
stands in the way of adjudication on the merits.91 For example,
some courts have found that an “improper venue” may exist when
the statutory venue provisions are met but the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over defendants.92 Thus, a motion to
transfer under § 1406 must be denied when venue is proper and
the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.93
Prior to the enactment of § 1406, dismissal was the only
option for a court faced with a case filed in an improper venue.94
court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or
not.”).
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court . . . shall dismiss, or if it be
in the interest of justice transfer such case . . . .” (emphasis added)); Jhong, 28
U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (discussing the means by which transfer is
accomplished under § 1406).
90. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 (“A prerequisite to
invoking § 1406(a) is that the venue chosen by the plaintiff is improper.”);
Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (discussing the means by which
transfer is accomplished under § 1406 and listing cases in support).
91. See Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 1967) (noting
that “the first forum chosen is improper in the sense that the litigation may not
proceed there”); Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1967) (“The
statute does not refer to ‘wrong’ venue, but rather to venue laid in a ‘wrong
division or district.’ We conclude that a district is ‘wrong’ within the meaning of
§ 1406 whenever there exists and ‘obstacle [to] . . . an expeditious and orderly
adjudication’ on the merits.”); Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467
n.12 (noting that the term “improper venue” has been interpreted broadly).
92. See Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255, 257–58 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that
§ 1406 has been interpreted “to afford broad remedial relief” and listing circuits
in agreement); Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (noting that the
term “improper venue” has been expanded and listing cases in support).
93. See Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (noting that § 1406
is not concerned with the convenience of the parties, only whether venue is
proper); supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (discussing the expansive
definition of “improper venue”).
94. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 430 (1965) (stating
that § 1406(a) prevents “the unfairness of barring a plaintiff’s action solely
because a prior timely action is dismissed for improper venue after the
applicable statute of limitations has run”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S.
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Section 1406 is a way to transfer a case, rather than to dismiss it,
and “avoid . . . the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs
from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an
erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact
of the kind upon which venue provisions would turn.”95 Similar to
§ 1404, § 1406 was designed to remove “whatever obstacles may
impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and
controversies on their merits.”96 The similarity of purpose and of
result between § 1404 and § 1406, however, has created
significant confusion.97 While the line between the two statutes
can become blurred, the two are mutually exclusive.98 As one
court explains, “Section 1404(a) permits transfer of a civil action
to any other district in which it could have been brought, and
refers to a civil action in which venue is properly laid . . . . Section
1406(a) pertains to transfer of a case laying venue in the ‘wrong
district.’”99
In general, when a case is transferred under § 1406 to correct
filing in an improper venue, the law of the transferee (receiving)
court will apply.100 The different choice-of-law rules that apply
463, 466 (1962) (noting that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) was to avoid
injustices such as plaintiff “losing a substantial part of its cause of action under
the statute of limitations” because it made a mistake in venue).
95. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466; see 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827
(detailing the goals of § 1406(a)).
96. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466.
97. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 (noting that a number of
courts have said that either § 1404 or § 1406 may be used a basis for transfer).
98. Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1147 (5th Cir.
1984) (noting that § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) are “both short, apparently clear, and
seemingly mutually exclusive”); Ellis v. Great S.W. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1104
(5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) (explaining that “sections 1404(a) and 1406(a)
would appear to apply in two mutually exclusive situations” (citing Goldlawr,
369 U.S at 466–67)).
99. Liaw Su Teng, 743 F.2d at 1147.
100. See Eggleton v. Plasser & Theurer Exp. Von Bahnbaumaschinen
Gessellschaft, MBH, 495 F.3d 582, 588 (8th Cir. 2007) (relying on precedent that
requires the law of the transferee court to apply when a case is transferred
under § 1406 (internal citations omitted)); GBJ Corp. v. E. Ohio Paving Co., 139
F.3d 1080, 1084 (6th Cir. 1998) (“When a case is transferred [under § 1406(a)],
the choice-of-law rules of the transferee court apply.”); Schaeffer v. Vill. of
Ossining, 58 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Following a section 1406(a)
transfer . . . ‘the transferee court should apply whatever law it would have
applied had the action been properly commenced there.’” (internal citations
omitted)); Myelle v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 57 F.3d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting
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when a case is transferred under § 1404 and under § 1406 are
designed to “prevent forum shopping” and to deny any extra
advantage to a party who would not have been entitled to those
advantages if the case was brought in the proper forum.101 A
plaintiff should only gain the benefit of the law that would apply
in the original forum if the venue is proper and the court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.102
Again, similar to transfers effectuated under § 1404, a court
generally may not transfer less than a full action in a venue
transfer under § 1406, but certain claims may be severed from
the action and transferred on their own.103 Several courts have
severed claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21104 and
transferred those claims to a district where venue was proper.105
that “a district court receiving a case under the mandatory transfer provisions of
§ 1406(a) must apply the law of the state in which it is held rather than the law
of the transferor district court”); Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc., 975
F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992) (“When a case is transferred from a district in
another circuit, the precedent of the circuit court encompassing the transferee
district court applies to the case on matters of federal law.” (internal citation
omitted)).
101. See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983)
(explaining the reason that different choice-of-law rules would apply depending
upon the venue transfer statute invoked and listing cases in support).
102. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 (explaining the
interrelation between venue transfer and choice-of-law rules).
103. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953)
(noting that Congress, in creating the limited venue statute 15 U.S.C. § 15,
must have contemplated that venue might not be appropriate as to all
defendants of a single action and that “such proceedings might be severed and
transferred or filed in separate districts originally”); In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 15, 37 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding the severance and transfer
of certain claims to a proper forum is appropriate under both § 1404 and
§ 1406); Doelcher Prods., Inc. v. Hydrofoil Int’l, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 666, 669 (D.
Md. 1989) (severing a defendant from the plaintiff’s case and transferring the
remaining claims to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York); ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 310 F. Supp. 739, 744 (N.D.
Ill. 1970) (“[T]he conclusion that venue is improper in this District does not
require dismissal of the action against [two defendants]—they may be severed
from the main actions, and their actions may be transferred ‘in the interest of
justice’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) . . . .”).
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
105. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 762 F. Supp. 2d 18, 32 (D.D.C.
2011) (severing certain claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 and
transferring those claims to the South District of New York); O’Shatz v. Bailey,
220 F. Supp. 444, 446–48 (D. Md. 1963) (sustaining a motion to transfer for
improper venue, severing certain defendants from the action, and transferring

I LIKE TO MOVE IT, MOVE IT

2677

Severance and transfer of claims under § 1406 appears to be more
widely accepted than severance and transfer under § 1404 and
began shortly after the adoption of § 1406.106
3. Transfer to Cure Lack of Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1631
Federal statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1631,107 governs
when a venue transfer is effectuated for lack of jurisdiction:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court
finds there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in
the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any
other such court in which the action or appeal could have been
brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or
appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the
court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was
actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is
transferred.108

Section 1631 was enacted as part of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982109 to cure subject matter jurisdiction
problems that arise when a case was filed in the wrong court.110
the claims to the Eastern District of New York); United Nations Korean
Reconstruction Agency v. Glass Prod. Methods, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 248, 250
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (severing the action as to certain defendants and transferring
some of the claims to the District Court of Connecticut).
106. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 384 (noting that Congress
must have contemplated the possibility of severance and transfer in cases where
venue may not be appropriate as to all defendants); United Nations Korean
Reconstruction Agency, 143 F. Supp. at 250 (severing the action as to certain
defendants and transferring some of the claims to the District Court of
Connecticut).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012).
108. Id.
109. Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 1631, 96 Stat. 25, 55 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41,
1631 (2012)).
110. See Britell v. United States, 318 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that
Congress crafted § 1631 to ensure that litigants were not deprived of a remedy
due to error or procedural technicality resulting from some statutory
uncertainty and to prevent duplicative litigation that would result if litigants
were required to file in two courts to ensure jurisdiction); United States v. Am.
River Transp., Inc., 150 F.R.D. 587, 591 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (“The impetus for this
legislation was the jurisdictional confusion caused by the creation of specialized
federal courts, such as the Court of Claims, which have jurisdiction over certain
matters.”); Mortensen v. Wheel Horse Prods., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 85, 86–87
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Section 1631 was particularly necessary after the decision in
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,111 which found that transfer for lack of
venue or lack of personal jurisdiction could be effectuated under
§ 1406,112 but left no avenue for transfer when a court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over an action.113 Section 1631 was
designed to save the expenditure of time and money in refiling an
action after dismissal and to prevent a refiled claim from being
barred by expiration of the statute of limitations period.114
Section 1631 is a broad grant of authority to transfer a case
where “there is a want of jurisdiction.”115 The term “jurisdiction,”
as used in the statute, has created some controversy.116 Some
courts have found that § 1631 should be used only in cases where
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.117 Other courts have
(N.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that § 1631 was created to cure filing confusion when
“two or more federal courts” have jurisdiction and the “wasteful and costly
practice of filing an action in several courts to ensure that the litigant will not
be left ‘without a remedy because of a lawyer’s error or a technicality of
procedure.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 11 (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 21)).
111. 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
112. See id. at 466 (“The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to
authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in
filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal
jurisdiction over the defendants or not.”).
113. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 (noting that a court was
not permitted to transfer an action under §§ 1404 or 1406 unless it had subject
matter jurisdiction).
114. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 30 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,
40.
115. See Ross v. Colo. Outward Bound Sch., Inc., 822 F.2d 1524, 1526 (10th
Cir. 1987) (noting that “Congress gave broad authority [under § 1631] to permit
the transfer of an action between any two federal courts”); McLaughlin v. Arco
Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 436, 429 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that § 1631 “is broadly
drafted to allow transfer between any two Federal courts”).
116. See Cimon v. Gaffney, 401 F.3d 1, 7 n.21 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that
there is a debate regarding what the term “jurisdiction” means in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631 and listing cases in support); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.51[2]
n.7 (listing cases in support of transfer where subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking); id. § 111.51[3] n.8 (listing cases that have found transfer under § 1631
to be proper where personal jurisdiction is lacking).
117. See McTyre v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 102, 105 (D.N.J.
1990) (finding that § 1631 applies only when subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking in the transferor court); Levy v. Pyramid Co. of Ithaca, 687 F. Supp. 48,
51 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that § 1631 “was only intended to apply to cases in
which the transferor court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”), aff’d, 871 F.2d 9
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interpreted the statute to also authorize a transfer to cure lack of
personal jurisdiction or improper venue.118 The language of the
statute appears to be broad enough to address defects in both
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, but the legislative
history of § 1631 expressly refers to subject matter jurisdiction
and does not mention defects in personal jurisdiction.119 Limiting
transfer under § 1631 to instances where a case lacks subject
matter jurisdiction appears to be the correct reading and in line
with Congress’s intent, particularly in light of the Supreme
Court’s holding that transfer for lack of venue and personal
jurisdiction may be accomplished under § 1406.120
When a case is transferred for lack of jurisdiction, the choiceof-law rules of the transferee (receiving) court will apply to the
case.121 Much like in the case of a transfer effectuated under
§ 1406, applying the rules of the transferee court helps to
discourage forum shopping and prevents either party from
gaining advantages they otherwise would not have had if the case
had been brought in the appropriate forum originally.122 The
(2d Cir. 1989); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.51[2] (describing the
debate about whether § 1631 addresses subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, or both); Jeffrey W. Tayon, Federal Transfer Statute: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 189, 224 (1987) (describing the legislative history of
§ 1631 and explaining that “it appears to be directed to correcting subject matter
jurisdictional defects”).
118. See Ross, 822 F.2d at 1527 (allowing a transfer under § 1631 when the
transferor court lacked personal jurisdiction); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28,
§ 111.51[3] (citing cases in support of transfers effectuated under § 1631 for lack
of personal jurisdiction).
119. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 30 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,
40 (noting that the proposed § 1631 would authorize a court to transfer a case
that had been improperly filed to a court where subject matter jurisdiction was
proper); Tayon, supra note 117, at 224 (discussing the meaning of the term
“jurisdiction” in § 1631).
120. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (“The language of
§ 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however
wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the
court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or
not.”).
121. See Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 793–94 (10th Cir.
1998) (noting that when a case is transferred under §1631 then the transferee
court’s choice-of-law principles will be applied).
122. See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that different choice-of-law rules would apply depending upon the
venue transfer statute invoked and listing cases in support).
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federal circuits are currently divided regarding a court’s ability to
transfer less than an entire action under § 1631.123
4. Transfer and Consolidation in Multidistrict Litigation, 28
U.S.C. § 1407
There is also a statutory provision for addressing large legal
actions that are filed in a number of different venues. While 28
U.S.C. § 1407124 does not derive from the same historical roots as
the other sections mentioned, it is a representation of the goals of
the judiciary in creating simple, clear, and efficient venue rules to
address new challenges in litigation.125 Congress has created a
special legislative provision to address transfers in multidistrict
litigation: a case may be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 when
it is a civil action “involving one or more common questions of fact
that are pending in different districts.”126 The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation effectuates transfers if it determines that
“transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions.”127 The advent of large multidistrict tort,
patent, antitrust, and securities cases prompted Congress to
“provide judicial machinery to transfer, for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings, civil actions, having one or
123. See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.51[2] nn.7.0.2 & 7.1 (noting
the existence of a circuit split with the D.C. Circuit on one side and the Third,
Tenth, and Federal Circuit on the other); infra Part III.A (discussing the circuit
split).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
125. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE REPORT,
PROCEDURE IN ANTI-TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES, reprinted in Hon.
Leon R. Yankwich, “Short Cuts” in Long Cases: A Commentary on the Report
Entitled Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases Adopted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, September 26, 1951, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62–
84 (1952) (reviewing problems presented by an increase in complex cases and
recommending certain judicial solutions); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GROUP
ON PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIGATION, HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED
PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES, 25 F.R.D. 351, 373–432
(1960) (explaining non-mandatory procedures for addressing complex cases); 15
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3861 (discussing the historical development of
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
127. Id.
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more common questions of fact, pending in different judicial
districts.”128 Section 1407 was enacted in 1968 to provide
“centralized management” of pretrial proceedings in multidistrict
litigation to “assure just and efficient conduct.”129 It is important
to note that a transfer under § 1407 is for pretrial proceedings,
not trial or final disposition of the case,130 although a transferee
court does have the power to handle dispositive pretrial
motions.131
When presented with a case involving a number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, or third-party claims, the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has the authority to separate
any claim from the action, and it may transfer the claims or
remand them,132 including claims that lack common questions of
fact.133 The Panel’s discretion to separate claims is limited,
however, and it may not sever claims that share a common
question of fact or assign them to different courts.134 The Panel is
not designed to address substantive or procedural matters, but
only to determine whether actions ought to be transferred for
128. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at *1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1898, 1898.
129. Id. at *2–3.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“[E]ach action so transferred shall be
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings
to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously
terminated . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at *3 (“[T]he bill provides for the
transfer of venue to an action for the limited purpose of conducting coordinated
pretrial proceedings.”).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (providing that a court may address pretrial
proceedings); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 112.03 n.74 (listing cases in
support of the proposition that a transferee court may handle dispositive
motions).
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“[T]he panel may separate any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before
the remainder of the action is remanded.”); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28,
§ 112.02 n.12 (citing cases in support of the Panel’s authority to separate
claims).
133. See In re 1980 Decennial Census Adjustment Litig., 506 F. Supp. 648,
650–51 (J.P.M.L. 1981) (requiring that “claims to be returned to the transferor
court involve little or no factual overlap with the claims to be transferred”); In re
Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 510 F. Supp. 1220, 1227 (J.P.M.L. 1979)
(requiring transfer of multiple claims because there was some factual overlap
and “substantial overlapping discovery [would] be required”).
134. See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 112.02 n.14 (citing cases in
support).
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pretrial purposes and whether actions previously transferred
should be remanded for trial.135 Similar to transfers conducted
under § 1404, cases transferred under § 1407 are governed by the
choice-of-law rules of the transferor court.136
C. Transfer After Severance Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 21
Prior to any partial transfer, the offending claims or
defendants must be separated from the action as a whole.137 The
most common means for separating claims and defendants within
a federal action is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.138 Rule 21
provides that: “On motion or on its own, the court may at any
time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever
any claim against a party.”139 If less than a full action is to be
transferred, the transferring claim and related defendants must
first be severed from the original action.140 Upon severance under
Rule 21, the single claim becomes a discrete and independent suit
and proceeds as a separate action.141
135. See id. § 112.02(d) (discussing the role of the Panel and citing cases in
support).
136. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 633–34 (1964) (determining
that the court should use the choice-of-law rules of the original court if the case
was filed in a proper venue); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941) (“The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in
Delaware must confirm to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.”); Andrew
D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in
Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 766–80 (2012) (discussing
the legal development of choice-of-law rules and how they apply when a case is
transferred to a proper venue).
137. See 4 MOORE ET AL, supra note 28, § 21.06 n.13 (listing cases in support
of the requirement for severance prior to transfer).
138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (providing for the severance of parties and
claims); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (discussing how Rule 21
severance is used); id. § 1682 (“The scope of application of Rule 21 is extremely
broad and covers any civil action in the federal courts.”).
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
140. See 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.06 n.13 (noting that severance
is a prerequisite for transfer of a claim and listing cases in support); 7 WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (explaining the use of Rule 21 as a means to allow
claims and cases to go forward towards trial).
141. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“The court may also sever any claim against a
party.”); 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.06 (listing cases in support); 7
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The main focus of Rule 21 and its historical predecessors has
been to correct misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.142 District
courts have broad discretion to address severance questions, and
the ability to sever claims and parties has been extended to a
broad variety of scenarios.143 To determine whether severance
should be granted, some courts consider whether the issues
presented are “significantly different,” whether the issues rely on
different witnesses or proof, or whether a party may be
prejudiced if severance is denied.144 All courts, however, seem to
agree that “[t]he decision of whether to grant severance is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”145
Like the transfer mechanisms noted above, severance is a
preferred remedy and is undertaken to prevent prejudice to a
party that may suffer due to a dismissal.146 Rule 21 may be
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (“Once a claim has been severed . . . it
proceeds as a discrete unit until its own final judgment, from which an appeal
may be taken.”).
142. See FED. EQUITY R. 43–44 (1912), reprinted in JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE
NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 238–39 (1913) (noting that a district court has
discretionary power to dismiss an action or allow addition of necessary parties);
7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (noting that the primary use of Rule 21
has been in the context of joinder of parties); Daniel K. Hopkinson, The New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compared with the Former Equity Rules and
the Wisconsin Code, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 170 (noting that Rule 21’s joinder rules
are “much more liberal than Equity Rules 43 and 44” which dealt entirely with
misjoinder and nonjoinder).
143. See 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.06 (explaining that the decision
to sever is “committed to the sound discretion of the court,” and listing cases in
support); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (noting the broad discretion of
district courts in severing claims and parties).
144. See German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1385, 1400
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[C]ourts generally consider (1) whether the issues sought to be
tried separately are significantly different . . . , (2) whether the separable issues
require the testimony of different witnesses and different documentary proof, (3)
whether the party opposing the severance will be prejudiced if it is granted and
(4) whether the party requesting the severance will be prejudiced . . . .”).
145. New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1082 (2d Cir.
1988); see 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.06 (explaining that the decision to
sever is “committed to the sound discretion of the court” and listing cases in
support).
146. See Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting
that discretion under Rule 21 includes consideration of what is “just” and when
there is a choice between dismissal or severance, severance is preferable);
DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 846 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Although a district
court has discretion to choose either severance or dismissal in remedying
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employed to remove non-diverse parties when federal jurisdiction
relies on diversity of citizenship.147 Severance has been found to
be appropriate in cases when separate treatment of an unrelated
claim was found to be in the interests of justice.148 Claims have
also been severed when venue is improper for some but not all
defendants and the claims are separable.149 Even where venue is
proper, claim severance has been found to be appropriate when
the forum is inconvenient for a party and the claim could be
separated from the rest of the action.150 In rarer circumstances,
claim severance has also been found appropriate when it would
enable a defendant to implead a plaintiff under Rule 14,151 or
when a private individual is joined as a codefendant with the
United States in actions where the United States must be sued
alone.152

misjoinder, it is permitted under Rule 21 to opt for the latter only if ‘just’—that
is, if doing so ‘will not prejudice any substantial right.’” (internal citations
omitted)); Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n
formulating a remedy for a misjoinder the judge is required to avoid gratuitous
harm to the parties, including the misjoined party.”).
147. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989)
(“[I]t is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to allow a
dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment
has been rendered.”).
148. See United States v. O’Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 369–72 (5th Cir. 1983)
(allowing severance of counterclaims and crossclaims); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 66, § 1689 (listing cases in support).
149. See 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (listing cases that support
severance for venue reasons).
150. See id. (listing cases that support severance for convenience).
151. See Sporia v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 143 F.2d 105, 107–08 (3d Cir. 1944)
(allowing severance for the purpose of impleader, noting that later consolidation
under Rule 42 was still possible); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (listing
cases in support of the use of severance for impleader).
152. See Lynn v. United States, 110 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1940) (finding
that “in the spirit of Rule 21,” a claim arising under the Tucker Act should not
be dismissed but that the claims should be severed); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
66, § 1689 (discussing instances when severance has been found to be
appropriate).
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III. Disagreement on Transfer of Less Than a Full Action Under
§ 1631
There is currently a circuit split regarding whether a court
may transfer less than a full action under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Similar to transfers effectuated under § 1404 and § 1406, the
Third, Tenth, and Federal Circuits have embraced transfer of less
than a full action under § 1631 if the interest of justice demands
it.153 The D.C. Circuit, however, has denied transfer of less than
an entire action because of the precise wording of § 1631.154 The
key division between the circuits is the proper interpretation of
the term “action” within the statute.155
A. The Circuit Split
The D.C. Circuit has found that a court may not transfer less
than an entire legal action.156 In Hill v. United States Air Force,157
the D.C. Circuit considered whether the D.C. District Court erred
in failing to transfer a claim, separated from the full action,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.158 The D.C. Circuit found that the district
court’s actions were acceptable because § 1631 “directs a court to
153. See infra notes 162–87 and accompanying text (detailing one side of the
circuit split).
154. See infra notes 156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C.
Circuit’s reasoning).
155. See infra Part III.B (discussing the statutory interpretation
disagreement).
156. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(“Because Section 1631 directs a court to transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks
jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim, we find that the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in failing . . . to transfer Hill’s claims . . . .”); Halim v.
Donovan, No. 12-00384, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91862, at *6 (D.D.C. July 1,
2013) (“[I]t is not clear to the [c]ourt that it would have the authority to
effectuate a piecemeal transfer of Plaintiffs’ ‘case’ against the City Defendants,
while retaining jurisdiction over Halim’s claims against HUD.”); cf. Bailey v.
Fulwood, 780 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that the court “may
not transfer the habeas claims while maintaining the Privacy Act claims,
because they arise in the same ‘action,’” but allowing the claims to be severed
into separate actions).
157. 795 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
158. See id. at 1070 (“[W]e conclude that the District Court did not err in
failing to transfer this case to the District Court in New Mexico pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1631 (1982).”).
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transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks jurisdiction, rather than
an individual claim . . . .”159 The D.C. Circuit has generally
adopted a “strong policy against piecemeal” cases or appeals.160
The court, however, has recognized a small exception when it has
dismissed certain claims, transferred the remainder of the case
elsewhere, and no other review of the dismissed claims was
possible.161
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Tenth Circuit has
found that transfer of less than an entire action under § 1631
may be appropriate when a district court severs, or demonstrates
the intent to sever, the transferred claims from the remaining
action.162 When a claim may be severed, the resulting pieces may
be disposed of as the court sees fit.163 The court borrows this
reasoning from its prior decisions regarding partial transfers
159. Id. (noting that when a federal court finds it lacks jurisdiction and that
another federal court has authority to hear the case, “the first federal court
must transfer the case to the proper court” (citing Ctr. for Nuclear
Responsibility v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 781 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))); see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. United States, 780
F.2d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[W]here a court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, it
must transfer such action to the proper court . . . .”).
160. Hill v. Henderson, 195 F.3d 671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
161. See Murthy v. Vilsac, 609 F.3d 460, 463–64 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining
that an exception to the court’s view of partial transfers may exist). The D.C.
Circuit exercised appellate review of a dismissed Title VII claim, a portion of a
case that was previously transferred to the Court of Federal Claims, because of
the “specialized jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal
Circuit’s treatment of partial transfers, neither the federal district court nor the
Court of Federal Claims could exercise jurisdiction over all the claims” in
plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 464 (citing Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 574
(D.C. Cir. 2007)).
162. See FDIC. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming
the district court’s order to transfer some, but not all, of plaintiff’s claims
because the court effectively severed the problematic claims under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 21 prior to transfer); Salazar v. Ashcroft, 116 Fed. App’x 167,
167 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that it lacked jurisdiction over certain
claims because the district court intended to sever those claims under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 21 and transferred the claims under § 1631 to the Ninth
Circuit); Burkins v. United States, 112 F.3d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1997)
(remanding case to the district court for severance under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 21 and transfer to the Federal Claims Court).
163. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509,
1519–20 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that when an action is severed into various
new and separate actions the court has discretion to treat the new actions
distinctly if appropriate).
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under § 1404: “§ 1404’s authorization for transfer of ‘any civil
action’ did not allow a district court to transfer a portion of the
action in the absence of a severance under Rule 21.”164 A
severance, the Tenth Circuit has noted, creates “two separate
actions . . . ; a district court may transfer one action while
retaining jurisdiction over the other.”165 The district court’s
transfer order, however, must “clearly indicate[] that the district
court intended to create two separate actions.”166 The Tenth
Circuit has found severance and transfer under § 1631 to be
discretionary and only to be used in limited circumstances.167 The
Tenth Circuit has noted that it is “aware of no authority even
permitting, much less requiring, a district court to unilaterally
split up an action and transfer the resultant components to
diverse jurisdictions” under § 1631.168 Severance and transfer
should be undertaken only “in the interests of justice,”169 and
even then, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that such an action is
within the court’s discretion.170

164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir.
1968)).
166. McGlamery, 74 F.3d at 222 (citing, in contrast, Chrysler Credit, 928
F.2d at 1519, which discussed an order that could not be construed as a Rule 21
severance: “[N]owhere in the order does the court refer to Rule 21 or imply that
two separate actions are being created”).
167. See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2011)
(citing Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1222–23 & n.15 (10th Cir. 2006))
(explaining that § 1631 should be considered to cure deficiencies related to
personal jurisdiction, but that in the present case there was no single court
where the action could be transferred with any “assurance that jurisdiction
would have been proper”).
168. See Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1249–50 (exploring a requirement to sever a
claim and transfer it to another forum).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012); see also Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210,
1222–23 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[a]lthough both § 1406(a) and § 1631
contain the word ‘shall,’ [the court has] interpreted the phrase ‘if it is in the
interest of justice’ to grant the district court discretion in making a decision to
transfer an action or instead to dismiss the action without prejudice” (internal
citations omitted)).
170. See Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1249 (“We are aware of no authority even
permitting, much less requiring, a district court to unilaterally split up an
action and transfer the resultant components to diverse jurisdictions under the
auspices of § 1631.”)
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The Third Circuit has interpreted § 1631 “to permit the
transfer of all or only part of an action.”171 The Third Circuit has
found that transfers completed under § 1631 are comparable to
those completed under § 1404.172 Similar to the Tenth Circuit, the
Third Circuit observed that “where a case could have been
brought against some defendants in the transferee district, the
claims against those defendants may be severed and transferred
while the claims against the remaining defendants, for whom
transfer would not be proper, are retained.”173 The court has
noted that such a transfer is not a partial transfer but the
creation of what may be regarded as “two or more separate and
independent actions.”174 Prior to transfer, however, a district
court should “weigh the factors favoring transfer against the
potential inefficiency of requiring similar or overlapping issues to
be litigated in two separate forums.”175
The Federal Circuit has completed a full analysis of § 1631
and has found partial venue transfers to be appropriate.176 While
171. D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, 566 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2009); see
Miller v. United States, 753 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing partial transfer,
but without an analysis of its decision to do so); Patchen v. McGuire, No. 115388, 2012 WL 4473233, *15–18 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012) (recognizing that the
court may transfer less than a full action should a claim or defendant be
severable); Liberi v. Taitz, No. 09-1898, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695, at *7 n.4
(E.D. Pa. June 4, 2010) (relying on the D’Jamoos decision regarding § 1631).
172. See D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 110 (discussing the comparability of § 1631
and § 1404 and the similarity of the means by which transfer is accomplished).
173. Id. (citing White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir.
1999)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 111 (citing White, 199 F.3d at 144–45); see Sunbelt Corp. v. Nobel,
Denton & Assocs., 5 F.3d 28, 33–34 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a court “‘should
not sever if the defendant over whom jurisdiction is retained is so involved in
the controversy to be transferred that partial transfer would require the same
issues to be litigated in two places’” (quoting Liaw Su Teng v. Saarup Shipping
Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984))).
176. See United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (holding that “§ 1631 allows for the transfer of less than all of the claims
in a civil action to the Court of Federal Claims”); see, e.g., Griffin v. United
States, 590 F.3d 1291, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (upholding transfer of a single
claim within a larger action (citing Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d at 1089)); James v.
Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that division of plaintiff’s
claims may be acceptable but not discussing the issue fully); Galloway Farms,
Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that “[c]ourts
have exercised their §1631 transfer powers but not usually, or preferably, in the
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the Federal Circuit differs from the other circuits because it is a
court of limited subject matter jurisdiction, its analysis of this
issue is thorough.177 Additionally, as a court of limited
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit is often confronted with cases
where it may lack subject matter jurisdiction over some of the
claims in an action.178 Looking specifically at the language of the
statute, the Federal Circuit has determined that while there was
support for the notion that § 1631 refers only to the transfer of
“civil actions”179 the language was not dispositive of Congress’s
intention regarding severance and transfer of an action under
§ 1631.180 The Federal Circuit found that the language of § 1631
should be interpreted in light of an additional statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292,181 which grants the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction
over an appeal “granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion
to transfer an action” to the Court of Federal Claims under
§ 1631.182 The court “read § 1292(d)(4)(A) as reflective of
Congress’s intention in § 1631 to permit the transfer of less than
all the claims in an action.”183 Such a reading provides a remedy
for a litigant who mistakenly files his or her case in a court that
lacks jurisdiction.184 Additionally, such a reading appears to be
form of bifurcation of claims,” but declining to transfer any claims in the case);
Carter v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 365, 370 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (“The Federal
Circuit has held that this statute permits the transfer of less than all the claims
in an action.” (citing Cnty. of Cook, 70 F.3d at 1089)).
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (detailing the jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit); Brian H. Redmond, Annotation, Jurisdiction of the United States Court
of Appeal for Federal Circuit Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 and 1295, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
694, 694 (2014) (discussing the scope the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction).
178. See supra note 176 (listing cases where the Federal Circuit had
jurisdiction over only part of the claims).
179. See Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d at 1088 (relying upon the use of the term
“civil action” in Rules 2, 3, and 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
180. See id. (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A) (2012) for insight on the
term “civil action”).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A) (2012).
182. Id.
183. Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d at 1089.
184. See id. (noting that litigants may have trouble filing claims in a proper
court due to the “complexity of the Federal court system and of special
jurisdictional provisions,” particularly with regard to the Court of Federal
Claims which may have jurisdiction over some claims but not others (internal
citations omitted)).
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logical. The court has noted that it was unreasonable to allow a
district court to transfer an action “containing a single claim over
which it lacked jurisdiction” under § 1631, but not permit the
court to transfer the same claim if the litigant appended an
additional claim to the action over which the court did have
jurisdiction.185 Thus, the Federal Circuit has allowed less than a
full action to be transferred under § 1631.186 Such a transfer may
raise other issues of jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims,187
but the Federal Circuit has found that it is both proper and
logical under the language of the statute.
The other circuits, while relying upon § 1631 in different
capacities, have not weighed in on the circuit split so definitively.
The Ninth Circuit, while not directly addressing the issue, has
accepted that a portion of a case may be transferred.188
185. Id.
186. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal
Circuit’s allowance of partial transfers under § 1631).
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (2012) (stating that the Court of Federal Claims
“shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or
his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the
United States”). A lack of jurisdiction under § 1500 may arise if only some of the
claims in an action are transferred to the Court of Federal Claims under § 1631
and the transferred claim and the retained claim “‘arise from the same operative
facts [and] . . . seek the same relief.’” United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170
F.3d 1084, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also d’Abrera v. United States,
78 Fed. Cl. 51, 57 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (“Section 1500 is not implicated . . . : (1) when
all of the claims in an action are transferred to the Court of Federal Claims . . .
and (2) when claims based on differing operative facts or seeking differing
remedies are filed in district court and a transfer is made to this court . . . .”
(citing Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d at 1091 n.8)).
188. See Baeta v. Sonchik, 273 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Under the
circumstances presented, transfer of the portion of the habeas petition raising
nationality allegations to this Court is appropriate.”). Magistrate Judge Hollows
of the Eastern District of California has also allowed severance and transfer
under § 1631 of four related claims, adopting reasoning similar to that of the
Third and Tenth Circuits. See Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL
2446098, at *5–7 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2012) (recommending severance of claims
against a single defendant and transfer to Minnesota); Johnson v. Mitchell, No.
CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643, at *8–9 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2012)
(recommending severance of claims against a single defendant and transfer to
Colorado); Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1594203, at *4–7
(E.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (recommending severance of claims against a single
defendant and transfer to Vermont); Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968,
2012 WL 691765, at *15–17 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (recommending severance
of claims against a single defendant and transfer to Colorado).
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Alternatively, the First Circuit has not excluded the possibility
that § 1631 may allow transfer of less than an entire action, but it
has declined to interpret the provision.189 The Fourth Circuit has
not weighed in on the circuit split.190
B. Division Regarding Interpretation of the Term “Action”
The key distinction between the divided circuits noted above
is the interpretation of the term “action” as it is used in § 1631.
The D.C. Circuit has found that the term should be strictly
interpreted and that “action” means something akin to the case
as it was originally filed or a case as it would appear when ready
to proceed to summary judgment or trial.191 A transferred action
will usually include all viable claims and any “tag along” claims
that were dismissed but might be subject to review when a final
order is entered.192 Additionally, while the D.C. Circuit is not
entirely clear on its understanding of the term “action,” it is
helpful to see how the court has interpreted the term in other
contexts. For example, the D.C. Circuit has also strictly
interpreted the term “civil action” in § 717 of the Equal
189. See Cimon v. Gaffney, 401 F.3d 1, 7 n.20 (1st Cir. 2005) (refusing to
affirm or review defendant’s argument that § 1631 “directs a court to transfer an
‘action’ over which it lacks jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim”
(quoting Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986))).
190. See Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-50, 2011 WL 3820711, at *10 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 26, 2011) (noting that “[a]lthough the Fourth Circuit has not addressed
the application of § 46110 with respect to transfer under § 1631, other federal
circuits have concluded . . . that § 1631 permits the severance and transfer of
less than an entire action” (internal references omitted)).
191. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(“Because Section 1631 directs a court to transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks
jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim, we find that the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in failing . . . to transfer Hill's claims . . . .”); supra notes
156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s view of the circuit
split).
192. See Hill v. Henderson, 195 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“‘The review
of any order of the district court in a transferred cause, made before transfer, is
within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals of the circuit to which the cause
has been transferred.’” (quoting Magnetic Eng’g & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co.,
178 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1950))); Murthy v. Vilsac, 609 F.3d 460, 463–64 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (noting an exception to the Hill rule when the court of appeals of the
circuit to which the cause has been transferred is unable to hear an appeal of
the dismissed claim).
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Employment Opportunity Act193 and has found that Congress
could have used a different term if it meant something other than
“civil action.”194
Alternatively, the Tenth Circuit and the Third Circuit have
looked to previous transfers under § 1404 to support their
allowance of partial transfers.195 Relying on a decision that dealt
with transfer under § 1404, the Tenth Circuit has found that
transfer was appropriate if severance under Rule 21 was
completed or the district court intended to sever the offending
claims from the action.196 For transfer effectuated under § 1404,
the Tenth Circuit has found that an “action” may change
depending upon the dismissal or severance of certain parts.197
The original action is maintained even if certain claims are
severed and transferred elsewhere.198 The Third Circuit has
found that transfer under § 1404 is similar to transfer under
§ 1631 and “where a case could have been brought against some
defendants in the transferee district, the claims against those
defendants may be severed and transferred while the claims
against the remaining defendants, for whom transfer would not
be proper, are retained.”199
The Federal Circuit has examined the language and
congressional intent of § 1631 and has determined that it “allows
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2012) (prohibiting discriminatory practices in
employment by the federal government).
194. See Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 120 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(noting that the term “civil action” is the “same term which characterizes
unrestricted suits” and Congress could easily have used a different term “had a
different type of proceedings been intended”).
195. See supra notes 162–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth
and Third Circuits’ views).
196. See FDIC. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding
transfer of less than a full action because the district court severed the claims
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 (internal citations omitted)).
197. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509,
1519–20 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the form of an “action” may change
over time (internal citations omitted)).
198. See id. (noting that § 1404(a) “authorizes the transfer only of an entire
action and not of individual claims,” but an action does not necessarily mean the
action at the time it was filed (citing Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614,
618 (2d Cir. 1968))).
199. D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, 566 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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for the transfer of less than all of the claims in a civil action to
the Court of Federal Claims.”200 The Federal Circuit has denied
giving the term “civil action” determinative weight, instead
looking to congressional intent and the statute’s legislative
history to determine the true meaning of the term.201 Prior to the
enactment of § 1631, a litigant’s only resource for preserving an
action when unsure of jurisdiction “[was] the wasteful and costly
one of filing in two or more courts at the same time.”202 The
purpose of § 1631 was to “remedy the situation where a litigant
has mistakenly filed an action in a court that lacks jurisdiction”
and prevent the costly—and perhaps unjust—dismissal of claims.
203

IV. Recommendation to Resolve the Circuit Split
As demonstrated by Johnson v. Mitchell and the cases
discussed above, the result of the current circuit split is
confusion, inefficiency, and inconsistent transfer use depending
upon which transfer mechanism is relied upon.204 Partial transfer
issues have arisen when cases are filed by pro se plaintiffs who
lack legal sophistication205 or even experienced attorneys who are
caught in the circuit split.206 If a court lacks jurisdiction over a
legitimate claim, and the court dismisses it, the plaintiff may be
200. United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1088–89 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
201. See id. at 1089 (noting that Congress’s intent is more clearly spelled out
in 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012)).
202. Id. at 1089 n.5 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 11 (1981), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 21).
203. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 30 (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 40).
204. See supra Part III.A–B (discussing the circuit split and interaction
between the transfer statutes).
205. See Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643, at *1
(E.D. Cal. May 10, 2012) (discussing a case filed by a pro se plaintiff who sued
defendants across the U.S.).
206. See Butler, supra note 45, at 804–27 (discussing the problems and
unexpected pitfalls that attorneys encounter in addressing venue transfer);
Tayon, supra note 117, at 198–99 (noting that the ambiguities of venue transfer
prior to enactment of § 1631 were akin to “jurisdictional badminton” (quoting
Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.3d 1270, 1283–
84 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Levanthal, J., concurring))).
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forced to undergo the additional expense of refiling its claim or
deprived of a remedy that could have been achieved in another
venue had it been brought in time.207 A resolution is necessary to
prevent these issues from continuing and to help maintain the
efficiency of the judiciary.
A. Amend Title 28 to Reflect Allowance of Partial Transfers
The most effective way to resolve the circuit split and
overcome the current inconsistency regarding venue transfer is to
amend the term “civil action” in §§ 1404, 1406, and 1631 to
include the transfer of “civil claims.” Alternatively, to prevent the
excessive transfer of single claims or the “piecemeal” adjudication
of related claims,208 the phrase “or any civil claim upon
determination of severance” should be added to modify the term
“civil action.”
With the proposed amendment, § 1404(a) would read: “For
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action, or civil
claim upon determination of severance, to any other district or
division where it might have been brought or to any district or
division to which all parties have consented.”209 Similarly, the
proposed amendment to § 1406 would read:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case or

claim laying venue in the wrong division or district shall
dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such
case or claim upon determination of severance to any
district or division in which it could have been
brought.210

207. See Baeta v. Sonchik, 273 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing
an alien plaintiff whose habeas corpus petition was denied as late because a
district court refused to accept the filing and the plaintiff was forced to refile in
the appropriate court); Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *9 (discussing the
possibility that plaintiff would be required to refile his claim or lose the case due
to the expiration of a statute of limitations if transfer was not allowed).
208. See Hill v. Henderson, 195 F.3d 671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (expressing
the D.C. Circuit’s strong stance against piecemeal adjudication).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (proposed amendment in italics).
210. Id. § 1406(a) (proposed amendment in italics).
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Due to the current circuit split discussed above, § 1631 is the
most important statutory provision to amend. The proposed
amendment to § 1631 would read:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court
finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is
in the interest of justice, transfer such action, claim upon
determination of severance, or appeal to any other such court
in which the action, claim, or appeal could have been brought
at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action, claim, or
appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the
court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was
actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is
transferred.211

While the current circuit split does not include § 1404 and
§ 1406, it would be advantageous to implement an amendment
consistently across the three primary venue transfer statutes. A
consistent amendment would signal to the courts that the terms
are designed to be applied uniformly, despite the different
circumstances of transfer. Additionally, the terms “civil action”
and “case” as used in §§ 1404 and 1406 have already been found
to allow severance and transfer of less than the full civil action.212
An amendment to these two sections would simply bring the text
of the rules in alignment with their understood meaning and
application. Amending these sections of Title 28 to include the
term “civil claim” or “or any civil claim upon determination of
severance” would help to resolve the circuit split and provide
clarity and instruction in a complicated area of the law.
B. Amendment Comports with Congressional Intent and the
Historical Development of Venue Transfer Mechanisms
The amendment proposed above, or a similar one, should be
adopted because such a change aligns with the purpose and
intent underlying the creation of the various venue transfer
mechanisms. The various venue transfer statutes were created
211. Id. § 1631 (proposed amendment in italics).
212. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing partial
transfers effectuated under § 1404); supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text
(discussing partial transfers effectuated under § 1406).
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primarily to serve the interests of justice213 and to assist in the
“expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies
on their merits.”214 First, the forum non conveniens doctrine had
harsh consequences, and Congress sought to remedy those effects
by providing a means to transfer cases between forums in the
federal system.215 Statutory venue provisions were adopted to
prevent the cost, delay, and injustice that accompanied a forum
non conveniens dismissal and to allow more cases to be decided
on their merits rather than suffering from a convenience or
procedural dismissal.216 Section 1406 in particular was designed
to “avoid . . . the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs
from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an
erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact
of the kind upon which venue provisions would turn.”217
Second, Congress has repeatedly taken initiative to resolve
federal procedure conflicts and to promote clear and just venue
rules. Sections 1404 and 1406 were adopted as a response to the
problems presented by the forum non conveniens doctrine.218
Similarly, § 1631 was created as a remedy for cases subject to
dismissal and refiling because a court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.219 Section 1631 became necessary after the Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Heiman220 decision highlighted a court’s inability to use
the statutory venue transfer mechanisms when it lacked subject
213. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
justice and the “interests of justice” in the venue transfer process).
214. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962).
215. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
and intent for adoption of § 1404).
216. See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text (discussing the
legislative purpose for enacting § 1404); supra notes 94–96 and accompanying
text (discussing the legislative intent for enacting § 1406).
217. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466.
218. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
problems with the forum non conveniens doctrine); supra notes 54–56 and
accompanying text (discussing how adoption of § 1404 corrected some of the
problems of the forum non conveniens doctrine); supra notes 94–96 and
accompanying text (discussing how adoption of § 1406 corrected some of the
problems with the forum non conveniens doctrine).
219. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining that § 1631 was
adopted to cure transfer problems when a district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction).
220. 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
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matter jurisdiction.221 Congress rose to the occasion and § 1631
was “broadly drafted to allow transfer between any two federal
courts”222 when “there is a want of jurisdiction” in the original
forum.223 Additionally, § 1407 is an example of Congress
responding to the growing needs of complex multidistrict
litigation.224 The rapid increase in large tort, antitrust, and
patent cases in the 1950s and 1960s prompted Congress to adopt
§ 1407 to “provide judicial machinery to transfer, for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings, civil actions, having one or
more common questions of fact, pending in different judicial
districts.”225
The current circuit split has created a situation very similar
to the one in existence when §§ 1404 and 1406 were adopted,
particularly for the D.C. Circuit. There currently is not a clear
and consistent way to transfer a claim from one jurisdiction to
another when a court lacks jurisdiction over one or more claims
within an action.226 Thus, the ability to sever and transfer a claim
for a want of jurisdiction depends upon where the plaintiff
decides to file her action.227 If the plaintiff files within the D.C.
Circuit and the court lacks jurisdiction over a claim, the court
must dismiss the claim (with or without prejudice) and the
plaintiff may suffer harsh consequences similar to those
experienced under the forum non conveniens doctrine.228 It is
221. See id. at 466 (noting that § 1406 was broad enough to “authorize the
transfer of cases . . . whether the court in which it was filed had personal
jurisdiction over the defendants or not,” but failing to extend its reasoning to
cases when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction); 14D WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 66, § 3827 (noting that a court was not permitted to transfer an
action under §§ 1404 or 1406 unless it had subject matter jurisdiction).
222. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 30 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 40.
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012).
224. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text (discussing the
historical development of § 1407).
225. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at *1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1898, 1898.
226. See supra notes 79–82 (discussing partial transfer under § 1404); supra
notes 103–06 (discussing partial transfer under § 1406); supra Part III.A
(discussing the circuit split regarding partial transfers under § 1631).
227. See supra Part III.A (describing the availability of partial transfers
under § 1631 and noting that partial transfer is available in some circuits but
not others).
228. See supra note 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing how the forum
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precisely this kind of scenario where Congress has intervened in
the past and provided guidance for the proper means of
transfer.229
Third, the proposed amendment reflects the flexibility and
“balancing-of-interests”230 concerns inherent to the development
of venue transfer mechanisms and severance. Currently, due to
the language of §§ 1404, 1406, and 1631 and the rigidity of their
interpretation, a district court is denied the flexibility to resolve a
lack of jurisdiction in a way that promotes justice for all
parties.231 In contrast, the forum non conveniens doctrine is a
flexible doctrine that developed in equity to promote fairness and
convenience.232 The doctrine decried rigid rules that limited
judicial discretion, even while recognizing that a plaintiff’s choice
of forum should be respected in a number of cases.233 Under the
forum non conveniens doctrine, “each case turns on its facts.”234
Additionally, the forum non conveniens doctrine anticipates the
availability of differing treatment for multiple claims within an
action.235 “Depending upon the facts of the particular case, a
district court may dismiss part of a lawsuit while deciding the
merits of other issues.”236

non conveniens doctrine works); supra note 207 and accompanying text (listing
examples of problems associated with dismissing a claim for refiling).
229. See supra notes 218–23 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s
previous activity to remedy confusion and conflict in venue transfer rules).
230. Atl. Marine Constr. Co v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 (2013)
(citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
231. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text (discussing the current
lack of flexibility in transfers effectuated under § 1631).
232. See supra notes 39–44 (discussing the role of flexibility and balancing
in the forum non conveniens doctrine).
233. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (describing the historical
concerns of balancing a plaintiff’s interest in choosing a forum with the
defendant’s convenience and ability to present its case).
234. Piper Aircraft Co v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (quoting Williams
v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 557 (1946)).
235. See supra notes 58–62 (discussing the possibility of dismissing part of
an action while deciding the merits of the other claims under the forum non
conveniens doctrine).
236. Scottish Air Int’l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224,
1234 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Flexibility has also been supported through the use and
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.237 Severance
of a claim is preferred to dismissal of a claim238 and severance has
been employed in a number of different scenarios to allow a claim
to proceed on its merits.239 Rule 21 and other joinder rules
“evidence the general purpose of the new Rules to eliminate the
old restrictive and inflexible rules of joinder designed when
formalism was the vogue”240 and to allow a claim to proceed to
adjudication on its merits.241
Finally, the proposed amendment will clarify and affect
venue transfer rules to reflect the majority of venue transfer
practices. A number of courts have already allowed individual
claims to be severed under Rule 21 and transferred to a proper or
more convenient venue under §§ 1404 and 1406.242 With regards
to § 1631, the Tenth, Third, and Federal Circuits have also
allowed claims to be severed and transferred to a forum with
jurisdiction.243 In addition to codifying the availability and
mechanism for partial transfer, the proposed amendment would
unify the practice of seeking transfer when a court lacks venue or
jurisdiction over less than the full action.244 A single, unified
means of addressing venue transfer assists litigants because it
helps them know the law prior to filing and helps both litigants to
correct mistakes without suffering the harsh consequences of
dismissal.
237. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
238. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that Rule 21 is a
preferred remedy).
239. See supra notes 143–52 and accompanying text (discussing the variety
of reasons why courts have severed claims and parties under Rule 21).
240. Soc’y of European State Authors & Composers v. WCAU Broad. Co., 1
F.R.D. 264, 266 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
241. See 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1681 (explaining the history and
purpose of Rule 21).
242. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing the
availability of partial transfer under § 1404); supra notes 103–06 and
accompanying text (discussing the availability of partial transfer under § 1406).
243. See supra notes 162–87 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth,
Third, and Federal Circuits’ reasoning for allowing partial transfers under
§ 1631).
244. See supra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to add identical
clarifying language to §§ 1404, 1406, and 1631).
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C. Current Transfer Mechanisms Cannot Solve the Problem
The proposed amendment is necessary because existing
common law and statutory transfer mechanisms are unable to
resolve the circuit split. The current split is the result of
disagreement in statutory interpretation, and a statutory change
is a clear and preferable way to resolve the conflict.
The forum non conveniens doctrine would not satisfy the
circuit split because it has largely been preempted by the creation
of §§ 1404, 1406, and 1631 and is now only applied when a case
cannot be transferred to a more appropriate federal court.245 The
doctrine, however, may be an advantageous tool when a court is
presented with an action that includes both a claim better suited
to a foreign jurisdiction and a claim proper for the district court
to decide.246 The ability to dismiss part of an action under the
forum non conveniens doctrine while retaining the rest of the
claims is possible in these rare circumstances.247 The forum non
conveniens doctrine may assist the courts in determining what to
do when presented with an action where they lack jurisdiction
over some claims and not others, but it is only applicable to a
small segment of the disagreement noted above.
It may also be possible to rely on other federal statutory
provisions to resolve the circuit split. Reliance on §§ 1404 and
1406 to remedy the circuit split, however, is inadvisable because
both statutes were enacted to remedy problems with venue, not
jurisdiction and certainly not a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.248 First, § 1404 was designed to transfer a case from
one proper venue to another, albeit more convenient, proper
245. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981) (noting that
§ 1404(a) was enacted to permit a change of venue between federal courts and
was intended to be a revision of the doctrine and not simply a “codification of the
common law”); supra notes 52–57 (discussing the current use of the forum non
conveniens doctrine).
246. See Scottish Air Int’l v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224,
1234–35 (2d Cir. 1995) (dismissing part of an action on forum non conveniens
grounds and retaining a claim because it “could only be decided in the Southern
District of New York”).
247. See supra notes 58–62 (discussing the availability of partial transfers
under the forum non conveniens doctrine).
248. See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the application of §§ 1404 and
1406).
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venue.249 While consideration of personal jurisdiction is inherent
to the decision to transfer a case under § 1404,250 it is a secondary
inquiry and not the purpose of the statute.251 There may be
instances where venue is proper, but jurisdiction is lacking.252
Any attempt to use § 1404 to correct a lack of jurisdiction distorts
the statute because it ignores the essential purpose of the statute:
to provide courts with a means by which they may transfer a case
from one proper venue to another for the sake of convenience of
the defendant.253
Additionally, misuse of a § 1404 transfer may result in
misapplication of choice-of-law rules. Transfer under § 1404
requires application of the original court’s choice-of-law rules,
while transfer under § 1631 requires application of the transferee
court’s choice-of-law rules.254 An improper transfer standard may
result in the application of the wrong substantive law and may
lead to an inaccurate or unjust holding.255
Likewise, transfer under § 1406 to correct subject matter
jurisdiction distorts the purpose of the statute.256 Section 1406
has been found to encompass transfers effectuated for lack of
venue and lack of personal jurisdiction.257 This section, however,
249. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
of §§ 1404 and 1406 and how the two statutes differ).
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2012) (noting that residency of a corporation
for purposes of determining a proper venue is dependent upon whether that
corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in a given judicial district).
251. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
of §§ 1404 and 1406 and how the two statutes differ).
252. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (noting that a civil action may be brought in a
judicial district where all defendants reside, where a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or where any defendant is
subject to personal jurisdiction if the other two provisions do not apply).
253. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the key
differences between §§ 1404 and 1406).
254. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing the choice-oflaw rules that apply to transfer under § 1404); supra notes 121–23 and
accompanying text (discussing the choice-of-law rules apply to transfer under
§ 1406).
255. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of applying the correct choice-of-law rules in venue transfer to avoid
forum shopping).
256. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
of §§ 1404 and 1406 and how the two statutes differ).
257. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the Goldlawr
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is not an option for transfer in all circumstances where a court
lacks personal jurisdiction or where a court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.258 Thus, while use of § 1406 may assist the courts in
transferring cases that lack venue and personal jurisdiction, it is
only applicable to a part of the disagreement noted above. Section
1406 might provide a better remedy to the circuit split than
§ 1404 because the accompanying choice-of-law rules protect
against forum shopping259 and mirror those that accompany
transfers effectuated under §1631.260 While closer to the mark,
§ 1406 still does not address the entire disagreement noted above.
Finally, while partial venue transfers after severance are
possible under §§ 1404 and 1406, and under § 1631 in some
circuits, they are not common.261 The availability of claim
severance and transfer of that claim to an appropriate venue is
largely a creation of modern statutory interpretation and common
law.262 These options for venue transfer are not reliable and their
inconsistent use creates confusion and may provide opportunities
for abuse.263 Congressional action appears to be the most helpful
means of resolving the circuit split. The current situation is
similar to instances where Congress has acted in the past,264 and
decision which expanded the concept of “improper venue” to cases where venue
and personal jurisdiction were lacking).
258. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text (explaining that, prior
to the adoption of § 1631, courts were unable to transfer cases when they lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the action).
259. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (explaining the choiceof-law rules that accompany transfers effectuated under § 1406).
260. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (discussing the choiceof-law rules that apply when transfer is completed under § 1631).
261. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (exploring the
availability of partial transfers under § 1404); supra notes 103–06 and
accompanying text (discussing the availability of partial transfers under
§ 1406); supra Part III.A (explaining the availability of partial transfers under
§ 1631 and the current circuit split).
262. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing the
availability of partial transfers under § 1404); supra notes 103–06 and
accompanying text (discussing the availability of partial transfers under
§ 1406); supra Part III.A (discussing the availability of partial transfers under
§ 1631 and the current circuit split).
263. See Butler, supra note 45, at 804–27 (discussing the problems and
unexpected pitfalls that attorneys encounter in addressing inconsistent venue
transfer rules).
264. See supra notes 218–29 and accompanying text (discussing instances
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Congressional action would be particularly helpful because the
circuit split is primarily due to differing interpretations of
Congress’s use of the term “civil action.”265
V. Conclusion
The problem noted by the court in Johnson v. Mitchell266 does
not show signs of being resolved quickly. The D.C. Circuit has
determined that a court may not transfer less than an entire
legal action,267 but the Tenth Circuit,268 Third Circuit,269 and the
Federal Circuit270 have found that a district court may transfer
less than an entire legal action when the court lacks jurisdiction
over certain claims and the associated defendants.271 As discussed
above, the inconsistency and current lack of clarity regarding
venue rules can cause a number of problems, the least of which
are increased costs, delays, and dismissal of a meritorious claim
without the ability to refile in another forum.
The best means of resolving the circuit split is to amend Title
28 by changing the limited terms “civil action” and “case” in
where Congress has acted to remedy problems with venue transfers).
265. See supra Part III.B (discussing disagreement between the circuits over
the terms “civil action” or “case”).
266. Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643 (E.D. Cal.
May 10, 2012).
267. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(“Because Section 1631 directs a court to transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks
jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim, we find that the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in failing . . . to transfer Hill's claims . . . .”); supra notes
156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s views).
268. See FDIC. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming a
district court’s order that transferred some, but not all, of plaintiff’s claims
because the court effectively severed the problematic claims under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 21 prior to transfer); supra notes 162–68 and accompanying
text (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s views on the circuit split).
269. See D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, 566 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2009)
(permitting “transfer of all or only part of an action”); supra notes 171–75 and
accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s view of the circuit split).
270. See United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (holding that “§ 1631 allows for the transfer of less than all of the claims
in a civil action to the Court of Federal Claims”); supra notes 176–87 and
accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s rationale for allowing
severance and transfer of a partial action).
271. See supra Part III.A (discussing the circuit split in detail).
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§§ 1631, 1404, and 1406 to include transfer of “claims.” This
amendment would create consistency by allowing all district
courts to transfer claims that are filed in an inconvenient or
flawed forum. Such a change would serve the interests of justice,
and it aligns with the purpose and intent of the existing venue
transfer mechanisms. Additionally, an amendment is necessary
because the existing common law and statutory transfer
mechanisms cannot resolve the circuit split. While venue transfer
rules have proven to be flexible and responsive to a variety of
societal changes, the current split is a result of differing
interpretations of statutory venue rules. A statutory change to
clarify the scope and mechanism for venue transfer is the best
means to resolve a difference of statutory interpretation. The
historical values of fairness, justice, and flexibility noted above
are best served by amending the current transfer statutes to
reflect permissive transfer of claims within an action and
detailing a clear process for severance and transfer.

